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1109 
THE MINOR DONOR-SIBLING DILEMMA:  
ARE BONE MARROW DONATION DECISIONS UP TO THE 
PARENT OR THE CHILD? 
Christina Carone* 
For a society which respects the rights of one 
individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck 
of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for 
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought 
concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living 
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. . . . 
–The Honorable Flaherty1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Cancer Society predicts that in 2018, 174,250 
people living in the United States will be diagnosed with a type of 
blood cancer.2  This statistic signifies that approximately every three 
minutes a person living in the United States is diagnosed with a serious 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; University of Florida, 
B.S., in Psychology, 2014; SUNY Farmingdale State College, Certificate, in Health Science 
for Health Professionals, 2015.  I dedicate this Note to my brother, Rafaello, who was 
diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia when he was two years old.  I write this Note to 
bring light to this issue because I was a minor donor-sibling bone marrow match and was 
subjected to match testing when I was just ten years old.  I was not prepared for this 
responsibility prior to being tested, nor did I feel that I had the choice to say no.  I would have 
donated to Rafaello if he needed a transplant in a heartbeat; however, I was not adequately 
prepared for the responsibility imposed on me, and I believe that minor donor-siblings should 
be properly screened.  I thank Associate Dean Deseriee Kennedy and Dean Myra Berman for 
appreciated comments, helpful discussions and mentorship throughout the writing process.  
And I thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her invaluable insight, support and guidance as this 
Note would not have been possible without her. 
1 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (Ct. Com. Pl., Allegheny Cty. 1978) (emphasis 
added). 
2 Facts and Statistics, LEUKEMIA & LYMPHOMA SOC’Y, http://www.lls.org/facts-and-
statistics/facts-and-statistics-overview (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
1
Carone: The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1110 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
blood disorder.3  Childhood blood cancers are one of the most common 
types of cancers affecting children, adolescents and adults younger 
than twenty years old.4  For example, leukemia, a cancer that prevents 
blood-forming tissues from producing normal blood cells in bone 
marrow,5 is the second leading cause of death among this age group,6 
and children younger than five years old have the highest risk for 
developing acute lymphoblastic leukemia.7  
A child afflicted with a life-threatening illness such as 
leukemia may need a bone marrow transplant.8  Bone marrow 
transplants can be used as a treatment option; thus, parents are often 
overjoyed when they discover a Human Leukocyte Antigen 
(hereinafter “HLA”) matched sibling because finding a donor is a 
critical component of the transplantation process.9  HLA-matching is 
the most relevant factor when selecting a donor, and HLA-matched 
siblings are usually preferred if available because they are the best 
donors for the child in need of a transplant (“patient-recipient”).10  
Biological siblings are usually tested first because there is an increased 
likelihood that a biological sibling is genetically compatible with the 
patient-recipient and may qualify as a suitable donor.11  If a matched 
sibling is identified, that child is considered the best donor option.12  A 
biological sibling13 has a 25% chance of being a complete HLA-match, 




5 Blood Cancers, AM. SOC’Y HEMATOLOGY, http://www.hematology.org/Patients/Cancers/ 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
6 Key Statistics for Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/acute-lymphocytic-leukemia/about/key-statistics.html (last 
updated Jan. 4, 2018). 
7 Facts and Statistics, supra note 2. 
8 A bone marrow transplant is a type of allogeneic transplant in which bone marrow is the 
source of the hematopoietic graft.  CLINICAL MANUAL OF BLOOD AND BONE MARROW 
TRANSPLANTATION 3 (Syed A. Abutalib & Parameswaran Hari eds., 2017).  Peripheral blood 
and umbilical cord cells are other options available that use a different source of hematopoietic 
grafts.  Id. at 1. 
9 Alternative donor options are pursued in the absence of an HLA-matched sibling.  Id. 
10 Id. at 2. 
11 HLA Matching, BE THE MATCH, https://bethematch.org/patients-and-families/before-
transplant/find-a-donor/hla-matching/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
12 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1.  It can be inferred that match testing ends once an 
HLA-matched sibling is identified since that child is considered the best donor.  CLINICAL 
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2. 
13 A patient-recipient’s full biological sibling shares the same biological parents.  CLINICAL 
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2. 
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qualifying as an HLA-haploidentical-match.14  An HLA-matched 
sibling makes the best donor and is favored because the child is readily 
available for use, graft extraction, and possible future need.15  
Moreover, using these children as donors avoids complications of graft 
versus host disease.16  Desperate parents have resorted to the use of 
genetic engineering techniques to conceive a child for the sole purpose 
of finding a bone marrow match for their child in need.17  Children 
known as savior siblings18 are designer babies designed and born 
because their genetic makeup will be used to save a sibling’s life.19   
As soon as a minor sibling is marked as a suitable donor for the 
patient-recipient, that child is immediately labeled as a bone marrow 
match and possible donor regardless of whether the child has 
consented to participating in the process.  Contrary to what one would 
expect, these siblings do not have an option.20  This labeling 
simultaneously changes the identity of a parent’s child from a minor 
sibling—a child unaware of the responsibility that was just imposed on 
her—into a minor donor-sibling, who will have her bone marrow 
harvested for the benefit of the patient-recipient.  Minor donor-siblings 
play an integral role in the patient-recipient’s treatment plan, and this 
unsolicited commitment immediately burdens the donor child.  The 
bone marrow transplantation process can require the minor donor-
sibling to miss school to attend medical appointments and receive 
injections in preparation of the bone marrow harvest.21   
 
14 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2.  A haploidentical donor is a half-matched donor.  
For example, a parent is a half-match to her child.  HLA Matching, supra note 11. 
15 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2. 
16 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2. 
17 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2. 
18 See Kristie L. Trifiolis, Savior Siblings: The Ethical Debate, SETON HALL. L. SCH. 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP, May 1, 2014, https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1432&context=student_ 
scholarship. 
19 Id. at 2. 
20 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8. 
21 SickKids staff, Filgrastim, ABOUT KIDS HEALTH, http://www.aboutkidshealth.ca/En/ 
HealthAZ/Drugs/Pages/Filgrastim.aspx (last updated Feb. 28, 2018).  If a patient-recipient is 
fortunate enough to discover that a minor donor-sibling is a compatible bone marrow match, 
the sibling may be required to endure a series of injections containing the medication 
filgrastim, which can have serious side effects, in preparation for the donation procedure.  
Filgrastim Injection, DRUGS.COM (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.drugs.com/cdi/filgrastim-
injection.html; Filgrastim, CHEMOCARE, http://chemocare.com/chemotherapy/drug-info/ 
filgrastim.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  
3
Carone: The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1112 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
A donor’s cells can be collected in several ways; however, 
bone marrow is the preferred graft source for children patient-
recipients and common for pediatric transplants.22  Bone marrow is 
harvested in the operating room and requires the minor donor-sibling 
to be sedated under anesthesia.23  This surgical procedure is typically 
one day and has the risks common to general anesthesia, bleeding, 
pain, and surgical injury.24  The minor donor-sibling is put into a 
medically induced coma absent any purpose that provides a direct 
medical benefit to her.25  While the child is unconscious, a physician 
injects a needle into the center of the child’s bone and extracts the 
marrow.26  Transplant centers differ in the amount of bone marrow they 
extract from the minor donor-sibling.27 
The bone marrow transplantation process can have a significant 
negative impact on a minor donor-sibling and may seriously affect that 
child for the rest of her life.28  Minor donor-siblings often do not know 
they have a choice in participating in the transplantation process and 
feel pressured by their families to donate, despite the short-term and 
long-term physical and emotional impact the minor donor-sibling may 
 
22 See CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 10.  Bone marrow is preferred in children with 
hematologic diseases.  
23 Bone Marrow Transplant, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/ 
003009.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
24 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 3. 
25 Medically Induced Coma vs. Sedation, AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, 
http://www.asahq.org/lifeline/anesthesia%20topics/medically%20induced%20coma%20and
%20sedation (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); Risks of Anesthesia in Children, U.S. ANESTHESIA 
PARTNERS, https://www.usap.com/patients/pediatrics/risks-of-anesthesia-in-children (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2018).  
26 Bone Marrow Transplantation, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org 
/healthlibrary/conditions/hematology_and_blood_disorders/bone_marrow_transplantation_8
5,P00086 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  The medical risks known to be associated with 
extracting bone marrow through aspiration include the risk of being sedated under anesthesia.  
Id.  
27 There is a recommended cell dose for collection, but no indication of a limit on the 
amount extracted.  CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 7.  Transplant centers differ in the 
approach used for deciding how much marrow to extract.  CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, 
at 7. 
28 See Taylor E. White et al., Family Strategies to Support Siblings of Pediatric 
Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplant Patients, 139 PEDIATRICS 1 (2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5260146/pdf/PEDS_20161057.pdf; see also 
Harvesting Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0072612/ (last updated Dec. 30, 2016). 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 4, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/14
2018 MINOR DONOR-SIBLING DILEMMA 1113 
suffer.29  The American Academy of Pediatrics has recognized that 
medical professionals do not fully understand the long-term physical, 
emotional and psychological effects donating bone marrow has on the 
minor sibling.30  However, research has revealed that donor-siblings 
with an active involvement in the patient-sibling’s treatment have 
experienced feelings of anxiety, helplessness and guilt, which can have 
long-term effects on sibling development.31  Donor-siblings may feel 
isolated from their families after donating bone marrow and experience 
intense stress as a result of possible post-transplant complications and 
the possibility of the patient-recipient’s death.32  Further investigations 
of these long-term effects and the influence of the transplantation 
process on the minor donor-siblings’ development are necessary.33 
This Note will analyze the underlying constitutional principles 
respecting a parent’s and a child’s fundamental rights which relate to 
consenting to match testing and donations.  Part II of this Note will 
provide background about the requisite medical information in relation 
to bone marrow, the donation procedure, and the transplantation 
process.  Part III will address the legal arguments concerning a minor 
donor-sibling’s right to consent to, or refuse to submit to, medical 
testing and the transplantation process with respect to age and the 
appointment of a donor advocate.  This author will argue that a minor 
donor-sibling has a constitutionally protected due process right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse to submit to medical testing that 
subjects the child to an invasive procedure or to have an independent 
advocate represent her interests if she is not legally competent because 
(1) a child has a property interest in her body and its products such as 
bone marrow; (2) a child has a privacy right to be protected from bodily 
intrusions; (3) a child has the procedural due process right to be heard 
 
29 See Jane Elfer, To Investigate The Emotional Impact Of Sibling Bone Marrow Donation 
133 (October 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of East London), 
http://roar.uel.ac.uk/7137/1/Jane%20Elfer%20-%20Final%20Thesis%205th%20Nov%20 
2017.pdf.  
30 See Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, 125 PEDIATRICS 
392 (2010), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/125/2/392.full.pdf.  The 
AAP Ethics Committee addressed the need to conduct research monitoring donors and 
recipients to advance the effectiveness of transplants.  See id. 
31 Id. at 395. 
32 See Melissa A. Alderfer et al., The Social Functioning of Siblings of Children With 
Cancer: A Multi-Informant Investigation, 40 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 309 (2015); see also 
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30. 
33 See G. Gail Gardner et al., Psychological Issues In Bone Marrow Transplantation, 60 
PEDIATRICS 625 (1977), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/60/4/625.pdf. 
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by a neutral court, or be represented by an independent advocate prior 
to genetic compatibility testing; and (4) a child or the appropriate 
representative must give complete informed consent prior to medical 
testing.  Part IV of this Note will address how other countries and 
jurisdictions manage the care of a minor donor-sibling throughout the 
bone marrow transplantation process.  Part V will discuss this author’s 
proposal for a program, and finally, Part VI will conclude by 
addressing the critical need to protect a minor donor-sibling’s best 
interests throughout the transplantation process. 
II. THE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION PROCESS 
The bone marrow transplantation process is a complicated 
medical process that can have an emotional, psychological, and 
physical impact on a minor donor-sibling.34  Parents have the 
recognized right to make healthcare decisions for their minor 
children;35 however, a clear conflict of interest exists in cases involving 
minor donor-siblings that will affect their judgment.  Parents can 
prioritize and make decisions concerning the best interests of their sick 
child and minimize or neglect the effect of such decisions on the minor 
donor-sibling throughout the transplantation process.   
Bone marrow—a spongy tissue located inside bones—contains 
hematopoietic stem cells (hereinafter “HSCs”).36  HSCs are unique 
cells that have the extraordinary capability to differentiate into various 
types of cells that are responsible for producing the body’s blood 
components such as red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets.37  
In a bone marrow transplant, a donor’s marrow is extracted and then 
 
34 See W.L. Packman et al., Psychosocial Consequences of Bone Marrow Transplantation 
in Donor and Non-Donor Siblings, 18 J. DEV. BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 244 (1997), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9276831; see also K.D. MacLeod et al., Pediatric 
Sibling Donors of Successful and Unsuccessful Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplants (HSCT): 
A Qualitative Study of Their Psychosocial Experience, 28 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 223 (2003), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12730279. 
35 See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991). 
36 NCI Dictionary of Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/ 
dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=693540 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).  Hematopoietic cells, 
also known as stem cells, are immature cells that are capable of developing into any type of 
blood cell.  Id.  These cells are located in bone marrow.  Id.   
37 Blood & Marrow Transplantation for Children, MEMORIAL SLOAN KETTERING CANCER 
CTR., https://www.mskcc.org/pediatrics/cancer-care/treatments/cancer-treatments/ 
transplantation (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  
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transplanted into a patient to treat a disease.38  However, a bone 
marrow transplant requires identifying a compatible donor whose 
genes at least partially match the patient’s genes; hence, siblings often 
serve as the best match candidates.39  
Ideally, the donor’s bone marrow should match the genetic 
make-up of the patient-recipient’s marrow as perfectly as possible.40  
HLA typing is used to match bone marrow donors and patients and 
thus determines whether a sibling is a suitable41 bone marrow donor 
for the patient-recipient.42  A minor donor-sibling can donate if she is 
considered a suitable match.  A bone marrow transplant procedure, 
also known as the bone marrow harvest, may be comprised of an 
aspiration component, which requires that the minor donor-sibling be 
sedated under anesthesia.43  During aspiration, a physician inserts a 
long needle into the minor donor-sibling’s bone—typically a large 
bone like the pelvic bone—to extract bone marrow which produces 
blood cells.44  The donor can remain in the hospital from early morning 
through late afternoon, or overnight for observation depending on the 
child’s age, response to receiving anesthesia, and the physician’s 
discretion.45  Among the common side effects of bone marrow 
donation reported two days after the procedure are back or hip pain, 
fatigue, throat pain, muscle pain, insomnia, headaches, dizziness, loss 
of appetite, and nausea.46  After the bone marrow donation takes place, 
a physician harvests the extracted HSCs from the donor’s marrow.47  
One or two days later, the doctor transplants the bone marrow into the 
patient-recipient’s body.48  However, a patient-recipient’s condition 
 
38 Allogeneic Stem Cell Transplant, CANCER TREATMENT CTRS. AM., 
https://www.cancercenter.com/treatments/allogeneic-stem-cell-transplant/ (last visited Oct. 
30, 2018). 
39 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1. 
40 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1.  The likelihood that the transplant will be a 
successful increases with a closer match. 
41 Allogeneic Stem Cell Transplant, supra note 38.  A suitable donor is genetically similar 
enough to qualify as a bone marrow donor. 
42 HLA Matching, supra note 11.  
43 Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26. 
44 Steps of PBSC or Bone Marrow Donation, BE THE MATCH, 
https://bethematch.org/transplant-basics/how-marrow-donation-works/steps-of-bone-
marrow-or-pbsc-donation/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  Although no stitches are involved, the 






Carone: The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1116 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
may not improve even after a minor donor-sibling donates her marrow, 
and the transplantation process is far from insignificant for her because 
of the medical complications and subsequent mental health concerns 
associated with the procedure.49  
III. LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING MINOR DONOR-SIBLINGS 
Parents have the constitutional right to make healthcare 
decisions for their children; however, the state can challenge a parent’s 
authority when the intervention is necessary to protect the safety or 
health of a child.50  The state has the burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that intervening in the parent-child relationship is 
necessary to ensure the health and safety of a child.51  Furthermore, the 
expectation of such intervention and proposed treatment must greatly 
outweigh the potential medical risks inherent for the procedure.52  
Minor donation cases have been consistently decided on a fact-specific 
basis and take into account the best interests of the parties involved 
and the legal competence of the minor.53  Litigation may arise if a 
minor donor-sibling has the recognized right to challenge a decision 
made by a parent or a medical provider concerning her best interest.  
Disagreements about this matter would create a state issue.54  
A. Preexisting Legal Standards That Have Been 
Applied to Minor Donation Cases 
Courts have employed various tests when deciding minor 
donation cases.  Courts have used the best interest test, which weighs 
the gravity of illness, the physician’s evaluation, the child’s preference, 
 
49 Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26.  Such complications may arise resulting 
from the following factors: the type of disease the recipient is being treated for; whether the 
recipient had prior treatments of chemotherapy and/or radiation and the dosages of such 
treatments; the recipient’s age, prognosis, and overall health and the closeness of the genic 
match of the donor to the recipient.  Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26.  Possible 
complications the patient-recipient may experience include anemia, internal bleeding, blood 
clotting, organ damage, delayed growth in children, graft failure, graft-versus-host disease, 
infections, and pain.  Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26. 
50 Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).  
51 Id. at 1116. 
52 Id. at 1113. 
53 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
54 Although the states have the responsibility to protect children, issues concerning minor 
donor-siblings should be addressed by Congress and will be discussed later in this Note. 
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and the risks involved.55  Other courts have used the competing 
interests test, which weighs competing rights and the substituted 
judgment doctrine in which a court substitutes its judgment for the 
minor’s to determine the child’s best interests.56  Generally, courts will 
make two inquiries when using any of these tests.  First, the court will 
consider the effectiveness of the proposed treatment by assessing the 
patient-recipient’s chance of survival with and without receiving the 
care at issue.57  Second, the court will examine the nature of the 
treatment and its risks by weighing the expected medical benefit to the 
patient-recipient against the invasiveness and effect of the treatment 
on the minor donor.58  Other courts have considered the mature minor 
doctrine, which gives a minor who can show maturity the legal 
authority to provide medical consent to a procedure.59  Courts utilize 
these legal standards to rationalize subjecting a minor donor, not 
legally capable of deciding for herself, to an invasive procedure that 
confers no direct medical benefit on that child.60  Courts have further 
supported minor donor decisions by anticipating the psychological 
benefits that may stem from the sibling relationship to justify 
proceeding with the transplant procedure.61 
1. The Substituted Judgment Doctrine 
The substituted judgment doctrine allows a surrogate decision-
maker, such as a parent or legal guardian, to establish what decision an 
incompetent person would make if that person were competent.62  
Courts that apply the substituted judgment doctrine to minor donor 
cases weigh the psychological benefits a minor donor will receive from 
proceeding with a transplant or donation against the medical risks 
associated with undergoing the procedure.63  Courts that use this 
doctrine grant parents the authority to make decisions for their 
 
55 Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1114. 
56 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
57 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
58 Id. at 1330. 
59 See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
60 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1330. 
61 See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (reasoning that a fourteen-
year-old would benefit psychologically from donating a kidney to a sibling).  
62 Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972). 
63 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1332. 
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children.64  Arguably, the court should not apply this doctrine in minor 
donation cases because an obvious conflict of interest exists.  In these 
cases, parents have a personal interest in saving their sick child and 
will prioritize that child’s needs over the minor donor-sibling’s needs 
and interests.  Therefore, the court should not utilize the substituted 
judgment doctrine because parents can be biased and their judgment 
may not be based on what the minor donor would do, but their 
judgment may be based on what they need for the patient-recipient. 
2. The Best Interest of the Child Standard 
Family courts employ the best interest of the child standard 
when making decisions that affect the care, custody, and well-being of 
children.65  This standard is a subjective and discretionary test which 
takes into account all circumstances that affect the child.66  Courts have 
used this standard when addressing cases that involve savior siblings 
and assess whether the psychological benefits of donating bone 
marrow outweigh the risks associated with the procedure.67  The 
medical definition of the best interest standard states that the standard 
is an “ethical requirement that people who care for others will do so in 
good faith, placing their assessment of that person’s best interests 
above their own.”68  This standard is relevant to the care of 
incompetent or dependent persons.69 
In Hart v. Brown, a seven year-old girl needed a kidney 
transplant.70  Her twin sister was a perfect candidate and identical 
match for the procedure.71  The Superior Court of Connecticut held that 
the parents had the right to provide medical consent for the minor 
donor-sibling to undergo the procedure.72  The court found that parents 
could consent to a kidney transplant on behalf of the donor child when 
the transplant was necessary for survival, procedure risks to each child 
 
64 See generally Hart, 289 A.2d at 386. 
65 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1331. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Best Interest Standard, FREE DICTIONARY, https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary. 
com/best+interest+standard (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
69 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322-23. 
70 Hart, 289 A.2d at 386.  Bone marrow donations involve a less invasive procedure 
compared to kidney donations; however, both require anesthesia. 
71 Id. at 387. 
72 Id. 
10
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were negligible, the donor did not need to take immunosuppressive 
drugs post-procedure, and each child’s prognosis for good health was 
excellent.73  Furthermore, the court and each child’s guardian and 
physician reviewed the parents’ motivations for moving forward with 
the procedure.74  In this case, the minor donor-sibling wanted to donate 
her kidney, and the court focused on the child’s intent.75  Moreover, 
the court used the best interest standard and assessed the risks and 
benefits of the kidney transplant before ruling and concluded that the 
minor donor would be better off in a happy family than a distressed 
one.76  
In Curran v. Bosze,77 the Supreme Court of Illinois used the 
best interest of the child standard to decide that three-and-a-half-year-
old twins should not donate bone marrow to their half-brother because 
the twins were not legally competent and did not yet possess personal 
value systems.78  The court determined that parental consent was 
insufficient to justify subjecting the minors to medical testing that 
would determine match eligibility for the donation.79  The court 
initially found that the substituted judgment doctrine failed to provide 
conclusive evidence of the twins’ subjective intent regarding donation 
because the twins’ morals, religious beliefs, and life goals could not be 
determined.80  Consequently, the court used the best interests of the 
child standard81 and addressed its three requirements.82  First, the 
parent providing medical consent for the minor has knowledge of the 
risks and benefits of the medical procedure.83  Second, the minor 
receives emotional support from the parent providing medical consent 




75 Hart, 289 A.2d at 387-88.   
76 Id. at 389. 
77 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
78 Id. at 1320.  Minor donor-sibling cases are distinguishable from Curran because most of 
these cases involve a full biological (shares both parents) sibling donor whereas Curran 
applied to half-siblings.  This author asserts that a greater conflict of interest exists when full 
biological siblings are of concern compared to half-siblings because the latter have an 
independent parent advocating for their best interests. 
79 Id. at 1376-77. 
80 Id. at 1324-25. 
81 Id. at 1324. 
82 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1324. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1343-44. 
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close relationship.85  The court concluded that the twins should not 
donate because they did not share a close relationship with their half-
brother with whom they did not interact.86   
Curran remains the standard case for courts when addressing 
minor donation issues.  However, courts should not use the best 
interests of the child standard to assess minor donor-sibling cases such 
as Hart and Curran.  Arguably, young children, such as the seven-
year-old minor donor-sibling in Hart, do not adequately understand the 
nature or the demands that the bone marrow donation process 
requires.87  Moreover, parents likely influence their children at young 
ages, and in cases involving minor donor-siblings, parents may not act 
in the donor child’s best interests when they prioritize the needs of their 
dying child. 
3. The Age of Legal Medical Consent: The 
Mature Minor Doctrine and Informed 
Consent 
In general, courts recognize individuals possessing the 
requisite legal capacity as competent and therefore able to consent to 
their medical care.88  Children are routinely presumed to be incapable89 
of consenting to their medical treatment; thus, parents have the legal 
authority to decide whether their minor children will receive medical 
attention.90  Although a parent has the legal authority to provide 
informed medical consent on behalf of a child regardless of what that 
child wants, the law does not explicitly establish that a parent has a 
protected fundamental right to consent for one child to undergo 
medical testing that simultaneously subjects that child to an invasive 
procedure that only may provide a physical benefit to another child.  
Similarly, the law fails to make certain whether a minor donor-sibling 
has a constitutionally protected right to consent to, or refuse, medical 
 
85 Id. at 1345. 
86 Id.  
87 Hart, 289 A.2d at 386. 
88 Alex Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment, 97 J. 
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 415 (2004), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1079581/ 
pdf/0970415.pdf. 
89 Incapable shares the same meaning as legally incompetent.  
90 See Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Decision Making, U. WASH. SCH. MED.,  
https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/parent.html (last modified Mar. 14, 2014). 
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testing that subjects her to, an invasive procedure that extracts bodily 
substances to be harvested for another’s benefit. 
The same complex considerations concerning a child’s 
voluntary participation in bone marrow donations are found in research 
projects in which minors are research subjects.91  In both contexts, 
issues of assent and parental permission arise.92  An independent 
physician should determine whether a minor donor-sibling is capable 
of assenting to the bone marrow transplant process.93  A minor donor 
assents when she affirmatively agrees to participate in the transplant 
process by actively demonstrating her willingness.94  A minor donor 
fails to assent even when she does not object or resist or when she 
simply complies with directions.95  An independent physician should 
consider the minor donor’s age, maturity, psychological state of mind, 
experience, and level of understanding before conducting bone 
marrow match testing.96  
Some jurisdictions apply the mature minor doctrine when 
addressing issues concerning minors and medical consent.  The mature 
minor doctrine allows a minor to have the legal authority to provide 
medical consent to a procedure if she can show that she is mature 
enough to make a decision herself.97  This doctrine considers the 
minor’s age and the circumstances surrounding the procedure as well 
 
91 See Michelle Roth-Cline & Robert M. Nelson, Parental Permission and Child Assent in 
Research on Children, 86 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 291 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pmc/articles/PMC3767214/. 
92 Id.  See Guidance and Procedures: Child Assent and Permission by Parents or 
Guardians, UCLA OFF. HUMAN RES. PROTECTION PROGRAM, http://ora.research.ucla.edu/ 
OHRPP/Documents/Policy/9/ChildAssent_ParentPerm.pdf (last updated June 9, 2016).  See 
also A. D’Souza et al., Is ‘Informed Consent’ An ‘Understood Consent’ In Hematopoietic Cell 
Transplantation?, 50 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANT 10 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC4320584/. 
93 Consent and Assent, INSTITUTIONAL REV. BOARD, http://www.uaf.edu/irb/faqs/consent-
and-assent/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2015).  Consent is defined as a voluntary agreement to an 
act or proposal of another.  See id.  In the United States, the legal age of consent is 18 years 
old.  Id.  Assent is the intentional endorsement of comprehended facts or an individual not 
capable of providing legal consent showing agreement to participate in an activity.  See id.  In 
minor donation cases, a child may be required to assent to the medical procedure.  See id.  The 
consent of a parent or legal guardian and the assent of the subject may be required when a 
child or an adult is not capable of providing consent.  See Consent and Assent, supra. 
94 See Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91.  
95 See Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91. 
96 See Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91. 
97 The Mature Minor Doctrine, USLEGAL, https://healthcare.uslegal.com/treatment-of-
minors/the-mature-minor-doctrine/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
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as other factors and behavior that can prove maturity.98  A minority of 
states has codified or adopted this doctrine.99  An Arkansas statute is 
exemplary of the standard representing mature minor doctrine 
requirements.100  The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this 
doctrine’s applicability to medical procedures, exclusive of 
reproductive rights.101  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never 
decided a case where the mature minor doctrine concerned medical 
testing.102 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the applicability of the mature minor doctrine to abortion cases.103  
Here, the State of Massachusetts mandated that unmarried, minor 
women attain parental consent to obtain an abortion.104  In cases in 
which the parents do not consent, the minor could petition the state 
court to determine whether she is mature enough to decide to have an 
abortion.105  The Supreme Court recognized that unemancipated 
minors possessing the maturity to articulate a preference for medical 
treatment may choose to obtain an abortion without the consent of a 
parent.106  The Supreme Court noted that a state court may consider a 
parent’s wishes, but if the court determines that the child is a mature 
minor, the parent’s wishes do not control because a child is not beyond 
the protection of the Constitution because she is a minor.107  State 
courts should consider the mature minor doctrine when addressing 
minor donor-sibling cases in a similar manner to their treatment of  
reproductive and organ donation issues involving the requirement of 
parental  consent for a minor to receive a medical procedure.  The 
Supreme Court recognized in Bellotti that a mature minor has the right 
 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  A few states such as, Arkansas and Nevada, have enacted the mature minor doctrine 
into statute, whereas Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Illinois, Maine and Massachusetts, high courts 
have adopted the doctrine as law.  Id. 
100 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602 (2018). 
101 The Mature Minor Doctrine, supra note 97.  The United States Supreme Court created a 
constitutional zone for children to make their own decisions concerning their health in Bellotti 
v. Baird.  428 U.S. 132 (1976) [hereinafter “Bellotti I”].  In that case, the mature minor doctrine 
was used to justify a child making a medical decision and providing consent on behalf of 
herself.  Id. at 132.  An analogous justification should apply to minor donor-sibling cases. 
102 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 622 (1979) [hereinafter “Bellotti II”]. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 643-44. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 633. 
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to decline or pursue medical treatment regardless of parental 
consent.108  In addition, the Supreme Court in Bellotti noted the 
uniqueness of the abortion decision because the procedure is 
irreversible.109 
Arguably, the decision to donate bone marrow deserves the 
same special recognition.  Deriving rights that the Supreme Court in 
Bellotti established for a child’s decision to obtain an abortion is 
appropriate because of the difficulty in locating a compatible match, 
the donor cannot simply postpone donation because the matter is time 
sensitive, and the invasive nature of the procedure which requires the 
extraction and harvesting of a child’s bodily tissues.110  Moreover, the 
decision to donate bone marrow is unique because the procedure is 
voluntary, elective, and does not provide a medical benefit to the minor 
donor-sibling.111 
In the case In re E.G.,112 the Supreme Court of Illinois 
determined that a mature minor has the right to refuse life-saving 
medical treatment.113  The minor was a few months shy of turning 
eighteen years-old.114  She was diagnosed with leukemia, and her 
treatment necessitated the administration of blood transfusions or else 
she would likely die within a few weeks.115  Her mother refused to 
provide consent for this medical procedure because it conflicted with 
her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.116  The minor also did not 
want to receive any blood transfusions for religious reasons.117  
Consequently, the state intervened and ordered a hearing to address 
 
108 Id. at 643-46. 
109 Id. at 646. 
110 Id. at 645.  An abortion involves a more invasive medical procedure as compared to a 
bone marrow donation.  Bellotti II also addressed a state statute regarding consent; however, 
minor donor-sibling cases may involve a child too young to be considered a mature minor. 
111 See W. Packman, Psychological Effects of Hematopoietic SCT on Pediatric Patients, 
Siblings and Parents: A Review, 45 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 1134 (2010), 
http://www.nature.com/bmt/journal/v45/n7/full/bmt201074a.html; K.D. MacLeod et al., 
supra note 34; W.L. Packman, Psychosocial Impact of Pediatric BMT on Siblings, 24 BONE 
MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 701 (1999), https://www.nature.com/articles/1701997.pdf. 
112 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989). 
113 Id. at 323.  This case involved refusing medical treatment due to religious beliefs, and 
the child’s and parent’s wishes were in alignment, which is distinguishable from some minor 
donor-sibling cases. 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. 
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whether a minor has the right to refuse critical medical treatment.118  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court appointed a legal guardian 
who was given the authority to consent to the transfusions on the 
minor’s behalf.119  The court maintained that this was in the child’s 
best interest.120   
The trial court addressed this matter further and held that the 
state’s interests outweighed the minor’s interest in refusing life-saving 
medical treatment.121  First, the court considered the doctor’s testimony 
that he discussed the proposed course of treatment with the minor and 
concluded that she understood the consequences of accepting or 
rejecting blood transfusions.122  In the doctor’s opinion, the minor had 
the maturity level of an eighteen to twenty-one year old and possessed 
the competency to make an informed decision to refuse the 
transfusions.123  Next, the court considered the minor’s testimony, 
which she gave after regaining her strength due to receiving several 
blood transfusions.124  She testified that she decided on her own to 
refuse the medical treatment because of her religious convictions and 
that she completely understood the nature of her cancer and the 
consequences of refusing the transfusions.125  Lastly, she testified that 
she requested sedation prior to the administration of the transfusions 
because the guardian’s decision upset her.126  The court noted that the 
minor was fully aware of the fatal repercussions absent treatment and 
that she made her decision on an independent basis.127  Moreover, the 
court recognized that in making its decision, it accounted for the 
minor’s maturity and her and her parents’ religious beliefs and 
desires.128   Nonetheless, the trial court maintained that the State had a 
greater interest in protecting the child and the State’s interests 
outweighed the interests of the child and her parents.129   
 
118 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323. 
119 Id. at 324. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 327-28. 
122 Id. 
123 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 322-24. 
124 Id. at 324. 
125 Id. at 324-55. 
126 Id. at 324. 
127 Id. 
128 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.   
129 Id. 
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On appeal, the court extended the holding of the case In re 
Estate of Brooks v. Brooks130 to mature minors.  The court justified its 
decision by referring to cases in which the United States Supreme 
Court permitted mature minors to consent to abortions, absent parental 
agreement or support through the exercise of the privacy rights.131  The 
court found this extension to be inevitable, even though the United 
States Supreme Court has not expanded this constitutional right of 
minors beyond abortion cases.132  The court reversed the lower court’s 
decision and held that mature minors can exercise the constitutional 
right to refuse medical treatment.133  The court rationalized its holding 
using the State of Illinois’s Emancipation of Mature Minors Act.134  
Courts will continue to have difficulty applying the mature 
minor doctrine to these cases because many situations requiring 
judicial intervention involve children under the age of ten years old 
who are not fully developed and likely not mature enough to decide to 
donate alone or understand the nature of the procedure.  In addition, 
precedent has established that a mature minor has the right to refuse 
life-saving medical treatment; thus, in cases involving minor donor-
siblings, a minor’s maturity should be assessed to determine whether 
the child has the recognized right to refuse treatment which conveys 
no direct medical benefit on her.  A parent should be allowed to 
consent on behalf of a mature minor donor-sibling if a court determines 
that the parent’s interests align with the interests of the mature minor 
donor-sibling as in situations involving Jehovah’s Witnesses who 
refused to consent to medical procedures for their children because of 






130 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
131 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
135 See id. at 325.  Other state courts have allowed teenagers approaching the legal age of 
majority to consent who also shared their parents’ religious beliefs and agreed with their 
parents’ decision to refuse medical care to provide consent to a medical procedure.  In re E.G., 
549 N.E.2d at 325. 
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B. A Child Has a Property Interest In Her Bone 
Marrow  
The body and its parts are sometimes treated as property and 
are sometimes the subject of privacy rights.136  All definitions of 
property encompass some type of ownership or legal right with respect 
to an object or thing.137  A minor donor-sibling should have a 
recognized property interest in her body and its products, such as bone 
marrow.  
Courts have struggled to determine whether human tissue is 
personal property.  In 2014, the Canadian Superior Court addressed 
this issue in Estate of Piljak v. Abraham.138  Here, the court concluded 
that excised liver tissue, which was collected for diagnostic purposes, 
was no longer personal property of the plaintiff-patient once the tissue 
was excised.139  The court maintained that a patient owns the biological 
tissue prior to its exiting her body; however, a patient loses possession 
and ownership rights over the tissue once it is excised.140  The court 
first defined personal property as a “class of property dealing with 
rights in a chattel or any movable or intangible thing that is subject to 
ownership and not classified as real property.”141  Arguably, bone 
marrow fits within such definition.  The court in Piljak Estate 
concluded that patients own the tissues in their bodies.142  The court 
referred to an article published by the Canadian Medical Association 
Journal, which discussed the rights associated with excised human 
tissue and how to determine tissue ownership.143  The article 
recognized that human tissue is excised either for the purposes of 
diagnosis, medical treatment or research and explained that it “is 
unquestionably true that patients own their tissue before it is 
excised.”144  Accordingly, the court in Estate of Piljak held that the 
 
136 Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human 
Body?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371 (2007). 
137 Estate of Piljak v. Abraham, 2014 CanLII 2893 (Can. Super. Ct. Ont.).  
138 Id. at 2897. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2898.  Carol C. Cheung et al., Defining Diagnostic Tissue in the Era of 
Personalized Medicine, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 135 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3563886/pdf/1850135.pdf.  This Note addresses who has rights to 
access excised human tissue.  
142 Estate of Piljak, 2014 CanLII at 2899.  
143 Id. at 2898-99. 
144 Cheung et al, supra note 141, at 137. 
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tissue is subject to ownership rights and can be defined as “personal 
property” because it is movable.145 
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,146 the court 
similarly addressed the question of whether excised human tissue is 
personal property.147  The court held that cells are no longer the 
property of a patient once they leave the human body.148  However, 
Justice Broussard’s dissenting opinion stated: 
[T]he majority opinion rests its holding, that a 
conversion action cannot be maintained, largely on the 
proposition that a patient generally possesses no right 
in a body part that has already been removed from his 
body. Here, however, plaintiff has alleged that 
defendants interfered with his legal rights before his 
body part was removed. Although a patient may not 
retain any legal interest in a body part after its removal 
when he has properly consented to its removal and use 
for scientific purposes, it is clear under California law 
that before a body part is removed it is the patient, 
rather than his doctor or hospital, who possesses the 
right to determine the use to which the body part will 
be put after removal.149 
Justice Broussard’s dissent properly recognized that an individual has 
a property interest in her body and its products.150  As such, a child 







145 Estate of Piljak, 2014 CanLII at 2897. 
146 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  This case involved an individual’s rights over her excised 
tissues which is distinguishable from marrow cases in which rights concern tissue inside the 
body.  See generally id.  See also Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 
(Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Kievernagel v. Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Ct. App. 
2008) (recognizing that gametic material is a unique type of property not governed by the 
general laws relating to gifts or personal property or their transfer).  
147 Moore, 793 P.2d at 498. 
148 Id. at 498-99. 
149 Id. at 151 (Broussard, J., dissenting).  
150 Id. 
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C. A Child Has a Privacy Right That Extends to the 
Right to Bodily Integrity and Personal Autonomy 
of her Body 
The protection of the human body is safeguarded by various 
legal doctrines including the constitutional right of privacy,151 the 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause,152 and the common law right to refuse medical treatment.153  In 
modern medical ethics, personal autonomy is considered to be of great 
moral importance.154  Medical ethics requirements oblige healthcare 
providers to respect a patient’s right to personal autonomy,155 and 
providers consider this principle to be a significant factor in making 
decisions about an individual’s health.156   
Arguably, a minor donor should have a privacy right with 
respect to her bone marrow.  The court in Curran acknowledged that a 
healthy child is rendered a victim when subjected to bodily intrusions 
that convey no direct medical benefit to that child.157  More 
specifically, it can be deduced from judicial decisions that taking the 
bone marrow from a child constitutes a personal bodily invasion and 
is a violation of a child’s constitutional rights.158  Courts have routinely 
refused to force one person to undergo a medical procedure for the 
purpose of benefiting another, even in circumstances where a blood 
relationship is shared, the risk to one individual is perceived to be 
minimal and the benefit to the other individual possibly will be great.159  
Moreover, it could be argued that minor donor-siblings are victims 
whose constitutional rights are being infringed by parents making 
decisions in their best interest.  These children are healthy; if they were 
not, doctors would not sedate them and extract their bone marrow for 
 
151 Rao, supra note 136. 
152 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
153 See id. at 777-79.  
154 See Alireza Parsapoor et al., Autonomy of Children and Adolescents in Consent to 
Treatment: Ethical, Jurisprudential and Legal Considerations, 24 IRANIAN J. PEDIATRICS 241 
(2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4276576/pdf/IJPD-24-241.pdf. 
155 See id.  
156 See id. 
157 Isabel Wilkerson, In Marrow Donor Lawsuit, Altruism Collides With Right to Protect 
Child, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/30/us/in-marrow-
donor-lawsuit-altruism-collides-with-right-to-protect-child.html. 
158 See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Ct. Com. Pl., Allegheny Cty. 1978). 
158 Id. at 90. 
159 Id. 
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harvesting.  Further, the extraction of bone marrow from the inside of 
a child’s bone constitutes a bodily intrusion because it requires the use 
of a large needle that is thick enough to puncture the strong surface of 
the bone.  This bodily intrusion of a healthy child without the child’s 
consent violates the child’s constitutional rights.  
In McFall v. Shimp, the plaintiff asked a court compel his first 
cousin, the only compatible bone marrow match, to submit to a 
transplant procedure and donate his bone marrow.160  Judge Flaherty 
of the Pennsylvania court addressed whether society can infringe upon 
an individual’s absolute right to her bodily security to save another’s 
life when the infringement is the only means available.161  First, Judge 
Flaherty discussed a moral argument embedded in common law that 
has maintained that individuals do not have a legal obligation to give 
aid or take action to save or rescue another.162  Next, Judge Flaherty 
asserted that the government exists to protect individuals from being 
invaded and hurt by another.163  Judge Flaherty then stated:  
[T]o submit to an intrusion of his body would change 
the very concept and principle upon which our society 
was founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the 
individual, and would impose a rule which would know 
no limits, and one could not imagine where the line 
would be drawn. . . . For a society which respects the 
rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular 
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it 
sustenance for another member, is revolting to our 
hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible 
extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the 
judicial mind.164 
Judge Flaherty correctly reasoned that an individual cannot be 
compelled to submit to a medical procedure that benefits another.  
However, minor donor-siblings do not have the legal authority to 
consent to, or refuse to submit to, medical testing or procedure, and 
parents with an interest to save another child hold the authority to 
 
160 Id. at 91. 
161 Id. at 91-92. 
162 McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92.  
163 Id. 
164 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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decide for these children.  These children need to be protected from 
being invaded by another as Judge Flaherty stated.165 
1. Congress’s Spending Power 
Congress can exercise its spending power to enact a statute for 
a program that is funded through a federal grant and protects minor 
donor-siblings through conditional spending.166  Although states have 
the responsibility to protect children, Congress should address issues 
concerning minor donor-siblings to achieve adequate protection for 
these children.  Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution 
provides Congress with the authority to govern according to its 
enumerated powers.167  However. the United States Constitution does 
not explicitly authorize Congress to regulate minor donations.168  
Consequently, Congress cannot compel the states to enact or 
implement laws that protect minor donor-siblings.169  Nonetheless, 
Congress can exercise its spending power to influence state law by 
incentivizing states to comply with the enactment of a federal program, 
funded through a grant, to protect minor donor-siblings.170  The federal 
program must explicitly state its conditions and have some relationship 
to the purpose of the spending program.171  States may opt to 
participate and comply with the program’s requirements.172 
Such legislation is critical to protect the minor who lacks the 
legal capacity to consent to, or refuse to submit to, medical testing over 
a parent’s decision in situations involving minor donor-siblings.  
Consequently, desperate parents frenzied over one dying child 
continue to hold the absolute legal authority to consent to medical 
testing for another child while expecting to act in the minor donor-
sibling’s best interest.  Although legal, ethical, and psychological 
concerns have been expressed about minor sibling donations, few 
 
165 Id. 
166 U.S. CONST. art 1. § 8, cl. 1 (granting the power to issue and collect taxes “to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defense and General Welfare of the United States”). 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See U.S. CONST. art 1. § 8, cl. 1. 
172 See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 1103 (1987). 
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cases have reached the courts because the legal management of minor 
sibling donations remains undeveloped.  
D. The Liberty Interest of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”173  Upon birth, a child acquires all of the protections afforded by 
the Fourteenth Amendment including the right of bodily autonomy 
because a child is a person.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects against government interference with specific 
fundamental rights and liberty interests.174  Additionally, precedent has 
established that the substantive due process right to bodily integrity is 
encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.175  The Supreme Court has held that the right to bodily 
integrity allows a woman to obtain an abortion, entitles an individual 
to refuse medical treatment,176 and allows families to make decisions 
concerning contraceptive use.177  Therefore, the substantive due 
process right to bodily integrity should be extended to include 
managing the care of minor donor-siblings, as these children should 
have the recognized right to refuse unsolicited or non-beneficial 
medical treatment.178 
 
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
174 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 
(1993). 
175 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 702. 
176 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
177 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (involving a nine-year-old voluntarily 
distributing leaflets); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving an Amish child 
explicitly agreeing to home schooling); see also Washington, 521 U.S. at 702; Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 261.  
178 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (stating that circumstances could never be 
compelling enough to justify a massive intrusion into an individual’s body, like a Cesarean 
section, contrary to the wishes of that person); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing that courts have “consistently refused to force one person to 
undergo medical procedures for the purpose of benefiting another person—even where the 
two persons share a blood relationship, and even where the risk to the first person is perceived 
to be minimal and the benefit to the second person may be great”). 
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1. A Parent’s Fundamental Right 
The Supreme Court has demonstrated in several contexts an 
unwillingness to intervene in parental decisions.179  This is 
demonstrated by a long history of precedent, which has unambiguously 
established that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in raising a 
child as she sees fit.180  In the context involving minor donor-siblings, 
the relevant liberty interest at issue pertains to a parent’s interest in the 
care, custody, and control of her child.181  
Parents have the fundamental right to make decisions affecting 
the care, custody, control and management of their children.182  This 
fundamental right is reflected in Wisconsin v. Yoder,183 where the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the “primary role of . . . 
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond 
debate as an enduring American tradition.”184  Further, in Parham v. 
J.R.,185 the Court stated that its “jurisprudence historically . . . reflected 
Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad 
parental authority over minor children.”186  The Court also held in 
Troxel v. Granville that a fit parent will act in the best interest of her 
children.187  In that case, the Court explained that a parent is fit so long 
as the parent adequately cares for her children.188  The State will not 
intervene in the parent-child relationship or “into the private realm of 
the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best 
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children” if the parent 
is fit.189  In light of this extensive precedent, it is clear that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment validates a parent’s 
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
control and management of her children.190  Thus, it is accepted that 
 
179 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
180 Id. at 58. 
181 Id. at 59. 
182 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 
(1982) (noting that parents have the fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
management of their children). 
183 Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 205. 
184 Id. at 232. 
185 442 U.S. 584 (1979).  
186 Id. at 602. 
187 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). 
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courts give considerable deference to parents and challenge their 
decisions  under limited circumstances.  
However, the Supreme Court did not intend for the 
constitutionally protected parent-child relationship to rationalize a 
parent’s decision to prepare her child to undergo an elective surgical 
procedure like donating bone marrow to a sibling.  There are limits to 
a parent’s authority to make decisions concerning the health and safety 
of her child.  The Court addressed this limitation to parental authority 
in Prince v. Massachusetts.191  Here, a parent was convicted for 
violating a Massachusetts child labor law because she allowed her 
nine-year-old child to voluntarily distribute religious pamphlets on the 
streets in the evening.192  The Court held that the state’s interest to 
regulate or prohibit child labor outweighed a parent’s constitutional 
right to bring up her children as she desires.193  The Supreme Court 
recognized that the rights of parents are subject to limitations because 
the state as parens patriae may intervene to protect a child’s well-
being.194  The Court noted that “[p]arents may be free to become 
martyrs themselves.  But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion.”195  Accordingly, parents 
should not make martyrs out of minor donor-siblings by analogous 
reasoning.  
At present, parents can continue to make martyrs of their 
children because siblings are likely the best  bone marrow matches.  
Parents should not be able to use the Fourteenth Amendment to justify 
exposing a child to a match test that simultaneously subjects that child 
to an invasive medical procedure and conveys no direct medical 
advantage to the minor donor-sibling.  The state should intervene in 
the parent-child relationship and should be able to further question the 
ability of a parent to make decisions involving minor donor-siblings, 
even if the parent is fit, because a clear conflict of interest exists that 
likely affects the parent’s judgment.  In cases involving minor donor-
siblings, courts should not give considerable deference to parents. 
 
191 321 U.S. 158 (1944).  While Prince concerns a parent violating a state labor law which 
causes the state to intervene in the parent-child relationship, minor donor-sibling cases do not 
involve this issue.  
192 Id. at 159.  
193 Id. at 160. 
194 Id. at 163. 
195 Id. at 170. 
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2. The Legal Authority To Provide Informed 
Medical Consent  
A child or an appointed legal guardian, not a parent, should 
have the legal authority to provide informed medical consent when a 
transplant involving a sibling is considered.  A child should be 
appointed by an independent advocate to represent her interests in the 
matter.  Arguably, an explicit conflict of interest exists when a parent 
decides whether to subject a minor donor-sibling to the bone marrow 
transplantation process.  Consequently, under these circumstances, it 
should not be presumed that parents will act according to the best 
interests of their children.  Courts should not give considerable 
deference to parents in these limited circumstances and should analyze 
their decisions.  
In Bellotti v. Baird,196 the Supreme Court balanced the interests 
of minor women in making the decision to obtain an abortion with their 
parents’ interests in having the constitutional right to raise their 
children.197  Here, the Court recognized that a parent should not have 
the absolute authority to decide nor the power to trump the decision of 
a doctor and his patient.198  It could be argued that minor donor-siblings 
should similarly be provided an alternative, such as having their 
interests represented by an independent advocate or guardian, when 
addressing whether the minor donor-siblings want to donate bone 
marrow after being completely informed about the process.  As 
pregnant minors can prove to the court that they are mature enough to 
decide to have an abortion, minor donor-siblings should have the same 
chance to prove to the courts that they are mature enough to decide 
whether to consent to donate bone marrow.  If not capable, the court 
may appoint a legal guardian or decide based on the minor donor-
sibling’s best interests, even over a parent’s objection. 
The court in In re Grady199 recognized that it should be the 
court’s judgment, in place of a parent’s good faith decision, that 
substitutes for an incompetent child’s judgment.200  Here, the parents 
of a mentally incompetent child asked the court to appoint a special 
 
196 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
197 See generally id. 
198 See generally id. 
199 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981).  
200 This case is distinguishable because it involves reproductive capabilities and the 
incompetence at issue is due to a mental impairment and a medical condition.  
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 4, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/14
2018 MINOR DONOR-SIBLING DILEMMA 1135 
guardian to authorize and consent to a medical procedure to sterilize 
their child.201  The court in Grady held that an appropriate court has 
the power as parens patriae and must exercise such power to make the 
final determination whether consent to sterilization should be given on 
behalf of incompetent individual;202 a similar position should be taken 
on behalf of minor donor-siblings.  The court also concluded that an 
independent guardian ad litem should be appointed when applying for 
authorization to sterilize an incompetent person.  The court maintained 
that it cannot authorize the sterilization of such person unless 
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in an 
incompetent person’s best interests.203  The court noted that if a person 
is legally incompetent in some matters, it does not follow that the 
individual is incapable of deciding in other matters.204  For example, a 
child who is fifteen-years-old may be legally incompetent because she 
has not reached the age of majority; however, this does not mean she 
is mentally incapable of deciding to donate bone marrow.   
Arguably, minor donor-sibling cases would not involve taking 
away a person’s reproductive ability or mental impairment condition 
as in Grady.  Furthermore, minor donor-sibling cases may not require 
as invasive of a procedure like in Grady; however, such cases similarly 
involve providing consent for an incompetent person to undergo a 
medical procedure.205  The court in Grady held that the authorization 
to sterilize an incompetent person cannot be given by a court unless 
persuaded by clear and convincing proof that sterilization is in the 
incompetent person’s best interests.206  For minor donor-sibling cases, 
a court should similarly not authorize a minor sibling to participate in 
the transplantation process unless persuaded by clear and convincing 
evidence that donating is in that minor donor-sibling’s best interests. 
The court also recognized the importance of appointing an 
attorney for the child when an application is made for the authorization 
of an invasive medical procedure such as to sterilize an allegedly 
incompetent person.207  This case signifies that appointed guardians 
must have full opportunity to meet with incompetent persons to 
 
201 In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 478-80. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 482. 
204 Id. at 483. 
205 Id. at 475. 
206 Grady, 426 A.2d at 482-83. 
207 Id. at 478-80. 
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properly represent their interests.208  As a legal guardian was appointed 
in Grady,209 an independent donor advocate should be provided to 
minor donor-siblings when a parent provides informed consent on 
behalf of a child not yet sufficiently mature to decide alone.  Congress 
should enact legislation that sets up a program to provide guidance in 
assessing whether a child is capable of deciding to donate, or whether 
a neutral court should hold a hearing to establish what is in the donor 
child’s best interests, which ensures that the child’s due process liberty 
interest is protected.  A standard should require the court to appoint a 
legal guardian or neutral advocate for the minor donor-sibling in which 
the advocate can provide informed consent.  Informed consent includes 
disclosing the risks inherent in the procedure, the potential side effects 
and the possible long-term effects to the minor donor-sibling prior to 
submitting to any medical test.210  Moreover, such a standard would 
safeguard the child’s interests prior to submitting to bone marrow 
testing.  Therefore, a minor donor-sibling should have a recognized 
constitutionally protected due process right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to have a neutral court hold a hearing or have a legal 
guardian represent her to determine what is in that child’s best interests 
when parental conflict211 arises or ethical questions arise. 
3. Judicial Intervention and Parental Conflict 
The state has a compelling interest as parens patriae to protect 
the well-being of children who are unable to protect themselves.212  
Judicial intervention is necessary when a parent’s decision to use one 
child to benefit another conflicts, does not align with the minor 
sibling’s or donor advocate’s wishes, or is contrary to a professional’s 
recommendation about moving forward with the procedure.  In such 
circumstances, a neutral court should determine the best interests of a 
minor donor-sibling, and the parent should bear the burden to prove 
why subjecting the child to an invasive procedure is reasonable or in 
that child’s best interest.213  Minor donor-sibling cases involve ethical 
 
208 Id. at 482-83. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Parental conflict may arise when a parent’s decision does not align with the 
recommendations of an ethics committee, a physician, a donor advocate or the desires of the 
minor donor-sibling. 
212 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
213 Id.  
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considerations that produce legitimate conflicts of interest for a parent 
because such conflicts of interest are likely to affect the parent’s 
judgment when making a decision that affects two children and has 
irreversible consequences.  The fit parent presumption should not 
apply in minor donor-sibling cases because parents will not make an 
unbiased decision concerning the best interests of their children.  
Tremendous conflict may arise in cases involving minor donor-
siblings because of the many ethical and legal concerns surrounding 
the interests of all relevant parties.  Consequently, these concerns must 
be assessed by balancing the interests of all four parties: the parents, 
the patient-recipient’s medical team, the patient-recipient, and the 
minor donor-sibling.  The parents are in a difficult situation when 
deciding whether to subject one child to a painful medical procedure 
in the hope of saving another.  This difficulty should not be minimized 
as parents likely do not want to imagine that they may lose their child 
to a life-threatening illness.  The parents have an interest in saving their 
dying child.  This includes an interest in subjecting a minor sibling to 
medical testing and in consenting to that minor’s bone marrow 
donation to benefit their other child.  Moreover, parents have the 
responsibility to decide the best interest of each child and should 
employ a cost-benefit analysis that minimizes the detriment to the 
minor donor-sibling.  However, parents’ judgment may be impaired 
when making these decisions because a clear conflict of interest exists.   
Overall, the patient’s medical team has an interest in effectively 
treating the patient in their care.  The physician has an interest in saving 
his patient battling a disease and has a responsibility only to his patient.  
The hospital has an ethical and legal responsibility to respect parents’ 
decisions concerning their minor children and has an interest in saving 
the patient.  Thus, the medical team has a primary interest in 
recommending treatments that it believes would fully and successfully 
treat their patient.    
The patient-recipient has an interest in surviving and 
undergoing a bone marrow transplant if a compatible match is 
identified.  The patient may put pressure on a sibling who is a 
compatible match to donate bone marrow.  On the other hand, the 
minor donor-sibling has a self-interest in refusing to submit to a painful 
medical procedure that requires anesthesia.  The minor donor-sibling 
may also have an interest in wanting to help her sibling to please her 
parents.  Arguably, the donor-sibling might feel pressured by her 
parents, her sibling, and the patient’s medical team when deciding 
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whether to donate bone marrow.  Therefore, only a neutral and 
independent third party, such as a guardian ad litem, can decide what 
is in the best interest of the minor donor-sibling.214 
In the case In re A.M.P.,215 the court agreed with the procedure 
employed by the lower court before granting the parents’ petition for 
authorization of electroconvulsive therapy for their sixteen-year-old 
child.216  Here, the court held a hearing and determined by clear and 
convincing evidence that the child was not a mature minor competent 
to make a rational decision on his behalf.217  The court considered the 
opinions from the treating psychiatrist and court-appointed medical 
expert and provided the child with an opportunity to be heard with the 
assistance of counsel and a guardian ad litem.218  The court looked to 
a statute governing involuntary treatment of adults for guidance in 
protecting the child’s best interests and her due process liberty 
interests.219  
In Parham v. J.R.,220 the Supreme Court held that a child’s 
liberty and due process rights were violated when she was committed 
to a mental institution, as desired by a parent, without independent 
medical review.221  Here, the court noted that parents have broad rights 
in raising their children, which includes medical decision-making, 
regardless of what the child wants.222  However, the state has the right 
to question a parent’s discretion when decisions put a child’s mental 
or physical well-being at risk.223  Furthermore, the Court maintained 
that parents should retain the roles of making substantial decisions that 
affect their children; however, involuntary commitment constitutes a 
 
214 A guardian ad litem should immediately be appointed to represent the donor-sibling in 
minor donor-sibling cases requiring judicial intervention.  The guardian’s recommendation to 
the court should be based on what would actually be in the best interest of the donor-sibling 
in light of all circumstances, even if the recommendation is contrary to what the child desires.  
See the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 105 (1988), codified 
as amended 42 U.S.C. § 5103, which requires states to appoint guardians ad litem for children 
in abuse or neglect proceedings.  
215 708 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
216 Id. at 1236.  This case concerns a minor patient’s due process rights whereas minor 
donor-sibling cases involve a sibling’s rights. 
217 Id. at 1239-40. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
221 Id. at 631.   
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 585. 
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deprivation of liberty and invokes due process rights.224  In addition, 
the Court in Parham stated that review by an independent medical 
examiner must occur prior to commitment.225  The Court recognized 
that review by the institution’s superintendent failed to qualify as 
independent, whereas review by the institution’s staff physician 
satisfied the due process requirement.226   
The enactment of a statute for a program that establishes a 
standard should similarly be used to review minor donor-sibling cases.  
A court should hold a hearing if conflict arises about a donor’s best 
interests, especially when the donor child is not considered to be 
competent or a mature minor.  Courts addressing this issue should 
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the minor sibling 
is a mature minor competent to make a rational decision on his behalf 
as in A.M.P.227  In making this determination, courts should consider 
the opinions from a medical expert, a donor advocate, and a neutral 
physician.  Additionally, courts should provide the donor-sibling with 
an opportunity to be heard and appoint an independent guardian to 
represent the child’s interests. 
Although review by an employee of the medical facility was 
determined to be neutral in Parham, in minor donor cases, review by 
an employee or individual associated with the transplant center should 
not be considered an independent review because such persons may 
receive paychecks from that institution, which exacerbates the conflict 
of interest issue.  Furthermore, medical facilities have a financial 
interest in performing the donation or transplant procedure.  As the 
Court in Parham reasoned that involuntary commitment invokes due 
process, a parent’s ability to subject the child to medical testing that 
could lead to an invasive medical procedure should also invoke due 
process.  In addition, the Court in Parham recognized that due process 
does not require a full hearing by a fact-finder.228   
States can create ethical committees that only review minor 
donor-sibling cases which would satisfy due process.  For example, 
such committees would evaluate and independently assess a minor 
 
224 Id. at 586. 
225 Parham, 442 U.S. at 631.   
226 Id.  In minor donor-sibling cases, a transplant center physician should not qualify as 
independent.  Parham involved involuntary confinement and did not concern anesthesia as in 
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donor-sibling’s physical, mental, and emotional health and consider 
the recommendations of medical professionals, such as independent 
physicians, social workers, and psychologists specializing in child 
development.  Such medical professionals would evaluate the overall 
health of the child and give an opinion about the minor donor-sibling’s 
mental, cognitive, emotional, and physical maturity.  The committee 
would review the professional reports and consider the minor’s age, 
the parties’ interests, the prognosis and condition of the patient-
recipient and the age and maturity of the minor donor-sibling when 
deciding whether judicial intervention is appropriate.  The committee 
members could be chosen through an application process and, if 
selected, be required to attend a training session that addresses legal, 
ethical, and medical issues surrounding minor donor cases.  Enacting 
a system like this would protect minor donor-siblings’ interests.  
Lastly, this process would consider the interests of the parents, the 
minor donor-sibling, the recipient, and the medical institution.  
IV. COMPLEX ISSUES CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT OF 
MINOR DONOR-SIBLINGS THROUGHOUT THE 
TRANSPLANTATION PROCESS  
Managing the care of a minor donor-sibling is complex.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that a minor donor-sibling is at a disadvantage 
during the care management process because of divided loyalties, 
pressures, and guilt within the family context.229  Thus, it is also 
reasonable to presume that conflicts of interests arise that may 
adversely affect the best interests of the minor donor-sibling.230  
It is evident that pediatric patients suffering from life-
threatening illnesses and in need of bone marrow transplants 
experience various psychological reactions throughout this process.231  
Most minor donor-siblings are not given a real choice or are pressured, 
if not forced, to undergo these donation procedures at such young ages 
without giving meaningful consent.  Congress and state governments 
have not put mechanisms in place to protect these children.  However, 
 
229 Janelle Mills, Understanding the Position of the Savior Sibling: How Can We Save Lives 
and Protect Savior Siblings? (Dec. 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Wake Forest University), 
https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39113/Mills_wfu_0248M_10493.pdf 
230 Id.  
231 D. Hutt et al., Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donation: Psychological Perspectives of 
Pediatric Sibling Donors and Their Parents, 50 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 1337 
(2015), https://www.nature.com/articles/bmt2015152. 
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the transplantation process unduly burdens and challenges every 
member of the patient-recipient’s family.  Parents are likely in distress 
when their child is dying, trying everything possible, including 
conceiving a savior sibling, for the sole purpose of saving the other 
child.232  In this difficult situation, parents are often relieved when 
discovering that a sibling has been identified as a donor.  However, the 
transplantation procedure involves two children (the patient-child and 
the donor-child), and each child’s best interest must be considered.  
During this difficult time, parents can experience high levels of 
emotional reactions that may interfere with their judgment because of 
worry, apprehension of the loss of a child, and fear of relapse if the 
transplant is not successful. 
Minor donor-siblings also experience reactions to the 
transplantation process.  These include emotional issues, such as post-
traumatic stress disorders, anxiety, and low self-esteem after donating 
bone marrow to a sibling.233  In a study that explored the psychosocial 
effects of bone marrow transplants, it was concluded that donor-
siblings are more likely to develop new behavior problems compared 
to non-donor-siblings.234  An additional study examined the 
psychosocial effects that sibling donors experienced after an 
unsuccessful transplant.  In that study, sibling donors reported having 
negative feelings including guilt.235  Moreover, a different study 
assessed sibling perceptions concerning the bone marrow transplant 
process, and siblings reported that they felt lonely, were not getting 
attention from their parents, did not have a choice, and were not needed 
for support.236  Lastly, in a study that analyzed siblings’ willingness to 
donate, siblings recognized concerns about the process in which they 
decide whether to donate, and a majority reported having no choice but 
to agree to donate.237  This study revealed that approximately one-third 
of sibling donors felt forced to donate.238  It cannot be presumed that a 
parent will only subject a child to an invasive and painful procedure 
when the health benefits exceed the risks of the donation.  Minor 
siblings must be protected throughout the transplantation process. 
 
232 Mills, supra note 229.  
233 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30. 
234 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.  
235 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.  The duration of experiencing these feelings is 
not specified. 
236 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.  
237 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.  
238 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.  
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A. Recommended Guidelines in the United States 
At present, Congress has not codified a standard addressing 
how to manage the care of a minor donor-sibling throughout the 
transplantation process.  The enactment of a federal law would provide 
guidance to transplant centers and protect minor donor-siblings from 
the many legal implications elicited from using a minor donor-sibling 
for a transplant procedure.  In the United States, transplant centers 
follow different recommended guidelines published by ethics 
committees and various organizations. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics Bioethics Committee 
(hereinafter “AAP Ethics Committee”)239 issued a policy statement 
that addresses the ethical considerations related to minor donors, not 
siblings, serving as stem cell donors.240  In analyzing these 
considerations, the committee used the benefit-burden test from the 
perspectives of the minor donor and the patient-recipient.241  The 
statement addresses the following ethical concerns: (1) an assessment 
of circumstances for when it is appropriate for a minor to serve as a 
donor and participate in the transplant; (2) methods to minimize the 
risks imposed on a minor donor; (3) the criteria involved in the 
informed-consent process; and (4) the donor advocate’s role.242  The 
AAP Ethics Committee ultimately concluded that minors can ethically 
serve as stem cell donors when certain conditions of the recommended 
criteria are satisfied.243   
The AAP Ethics Committee examined the risks and benefits to 
the minor donor, the recipient, and the family to determine whether it 
is ethically permissible for a minor to donate.244  Congress should 
provide guidance to transplant centers by delineating what a 
substantial benefit could be in minor donor cases.  For example, if the 
donor shares a close relationship with the recipient-sibling and the 
transplant would likely achieve an outcome of remission for the 
recipient, this would confer a donor benefit of continuing to share a 
close relationship because the patient may live after a donation.  
Congress should also prescribe a mechanism for using the benefit-
 
239 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 392. 
240 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 393. 
241 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396. 
242 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 397. 
243 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398. 
244 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 392. 
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burden test in which the benefits of using the minor donor and 
proceeding with the transplantation process are weighed against the 
potential harm or risks associated with the procedure for each child.245 
Additionally, the AAP Ethics Committee addressed the 
psychosocial risks and benefits experienced by the minor donor.246  
Minor donors do not receive any direct medical benefit from donating 
to a sibling.247  The benefit of helping a sibling in need is referred to as 
a psychosocial benefit.  Most importantly, children reported 
experiencing distress in relation to their role as a donor.248  Many 
pediatric donors believe that they did not have the option to say no to 
serve as a marrow donor, report being poorly prepared for the 
procedures, and describe feeling responsible for the recipient’s course 
after the transplant.249  Data has signified that donors experienced 
feelings of being inadequately prepared for what to expect post-
donation.250  Lastly, donor-siblings, as well as non-donor-siblings, 
have reported feeling neglected by their parents throughout this 
process.251  
The AAP Ethics Committee then recommended five 
requirements in which a minor may serve as a donor.252  First, there are 
no genetically compatible adult matches willing and available to 
donate.253  Second, at the present, the minor donor-sibling and the 
recipient-child share a close and strong personal relationship.254  Third, 
the bone marrow donation will confer a reasonable benefit to the 
recipient in need of a transplant.255  Fourth, the clinical, emotional, and 
psychosocial risks to the donor are minimized and are reasonable in 
relation to the benefits expected to accrue to the donor and to the 
 
245 See Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 
392-93. 
246 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398. 
247 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 399. 
248 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 395. 
249 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 395. 
250 See WI Sharma, The Experience and Preparation of Pediatric Sibling Bone Marrow 
Donors, 27 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE 89 (1998), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/957 
9018 (last visited January 4, 2018). 
251 See id. 
252 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396-
98. 
253 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396. 
254 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396. 
255 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 397. 
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recipient.256  The fifth condition recommends that parental permission 
and, when appropriate, child assent be obtained.257   
The first condition supports screening both adult and child 
family members in the initial donor search.258  However, national and 
international registries exist that are comprised of thousands of adults 
willing to donate and should be searched before subjecting a minor to 
the complicated transplantation process.  The rationale for the second 
condition identifies that sharing a close relationship with the patient-
recipient could increase the likelihood that the donor will experience 
some psychological benefit.  However, there is no guarantee that the 
donor will receive any benefit.  The third condition fails to define what 
qualifies as some likelihood that the patient-recipient will benefit from 
transplantation, and it does not provide examples of circumstances that 
could meet this threshold for guidance.  However, the statement 
acknowledged the difficulty of determining the threshold for the 
patient-recipient to justify proceeding with the donation procedure.  
Delineating this threshold is challenging because the patient-
recipient’s prognosis post-donation is uncertain.  The fourth condition 
states that the patient’s transplant team should help the parent consider 
the risks and benefits of using a sibling to donate from the neutral 
viewpoints of the recipient and of the donor.259  However, arguably, 
the patient-recipient’s transplant team is biased because it may be 
willing to proceed with the donation irrespective of the likelihood of 
its success.  Likewise, the parents might be unable to make a neutral 
decision that does not favor the interests of the child needing a 
donation.  As for the fifth condition, this author disagrees with the AAP 
Ethics Committee’s delineation of the donor advocate’s role.  The 
donor advocate’s primary obligation should only be considered to the 
minor donor when the advocate represents the child’s best interests 
throughout the transplantation process; donor advocates should not 
have any obligation to the parents. 
In the United Kingdom, legal scholars and physicians proposed 
that our policy be modified to protect minor donor-siblings to satisfy 
the legal requirements for application in the United Kingdom and other 
 
256 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 397. 
257 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398. 
258 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396. 
259 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396. 
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jurisdictions with comparable laws protecting minors.260  The United 
Kingdom’s statement explains that there is no moral or legal basis to 
violate a minor donor-sibling’s right to bodily integrity unless the 
recipient sibling will die without the transplantation and no other 
medically equivalent donors are available.261  
Although tissue harvest serves the best interests of 
recipient siblings, parents are also obliged to act in the 
best interests of the donor[-]sibling in the UK. Tissue 
harvest should proceed if and only if it serves the best 
interests of both the donor and recipient. Parents should 
be forbidden, and they are by UK law, to consent to 
tissue harvest unless there are substantial benefits for 
an incompetent minor that can outweigh the potential 
harm. There is no basis to subject a minor to the medical 
risks of tissue harvest if the recipient sibling can wait 
without significant risks of complications until the 
donor becomes Gillick competent. We also argue that 
the Policy fails to take into account recent advances in 
haematopoietic transplantation from haploidentical 
donors or related tissue-matched donors.262 
The United Kingdom’s statement properly recognized that a parent is 
obligated to act in the best interests of the minor donor-sibling as well 
as the patient-recipient child.263  Parents and doctors should ensure, if 
the medical conditions of the sick sibling permit a search, that no other 
sources of equally or similarly effective transplant are available before 
subjecting a minor to the physical risks and short-term psychological 
harm of donating. 
The AAP Ethics Committee’s recommended policy fails to 
protect a minor donor-sibling’s interest throughout the transplantation 
process.  In cases involving minor donor-siblings, the United Kingdom 
correctly proposed that the first condition should be replaced with a 
requirement in which the patient-recipient’s medical condition allows 
 
260 See Tak Kwong Chan & George Lim Tipoe, The Policy Statement of The American 
Academy of Pediatrics—Children As Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors—A Proposal of 
Modifications for Application in the UK, 14 BMC MED. ETHICS 1 (2013).  Foreigners have 
commented on and critiqued the recommended guidelines used in the United States regarding 
the care management of minor donor-siblings.  See id. 
261 Id. at 1. 
262 Id.  
263 See id. 
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a search; no medically equivalent related adult or histocompatible 
unrelated adult who is willing and able to donate exists prior to 
subjecting minor siblings to medical testing.264  This author further 
supports the United Kingdom’s proposal to replace the AAP’s third 
condition with a requirement allowing an incompetent minor sibling to 
be subjected to the donation process only if the patient-recipient would 
likely die without transplantation prior to becoming Gillick 
competent.265  However, the United Kingdom’s proposed modification 
of the AAP’s fifth condition266 fails to consider the issues surrounding 
parental decision-making and the clear conflicts of interest.  The 
United Kingdom identified that a parent must act in the best interests 
of the minor donor when making medical decisions that affect both 
children, not just the recipient; however, that expectation is not 
realistic because parents want to help their child in need.  The United 
Kingdom’s statement appropriately recognizes that a parent’s choice 
to use and harvest bone marrow tissue from one child to benefit another 
reflects an emotive desire to help the recipient sibling.267  Moreover, 
the statement recognizes that a donor-sibling may not necessarily 
obtain any benefits in light of the risks of serious injuries arising from 
bone marrow transplantation.  It is this author’s position that satisfying 
the five conditions provided in the AAP’s statement, alone, is not 
sufficient to justify harvesting bone marrow from a minor donor-
sibling because the guidelines fail to sufficiently protect the interests 
of a minor donor-sibling.  
B. The Judiciary’s Role in Protecting Minor Donor-
Siblings 
The AAP Ethics Committee maintains that minor donations 
should not require court review or approval and that judicial 
intervention should be pursued as a last resort.268  The Committee 
asserts that the primary role of the judicial review process is to ensure 
an advocate for the incompetent potential donor; however, an 
independent donor advocate should be appointed to the possible minor 
 
264 Chan & Tipoe, supra note 260, at 1. 
265 Id. at 2.  See Richard Griffith, What is Gillick Competence?, 12 HUMAN VACCINES & 
IMMUNOTHERAPIES 244 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4962726/. 
266 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, 398. 
267 Chan & Tipoe, supra note 260, at 5.  
268 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 400. 
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donor as soon as match testing is discussed.269  The Committee 
contends that an ethics consultation may be appropriate in situations 
where there is a concern about a parent’s motives or what is in the 
minor donor’s best interest.270  Requiring judicial intervention in all 
minor donor-sibling scenarios would open a floodgate of litigation and 
unduly burden the courts’ caseloads; however, in such situations 
judicial intervention should be required. 
The AAP Ethics Committee states that the role of the courts is 
to ensure that an advocate is appointed for an incompetent potential 
donor.271  Arguably, the law does not recognize a minor donor as 
competent as parents have the authority to make medical decisions for 
minor children.  Next, with respect to appointing an independent donor 
advocate, these advocates are not truly independent.  Medical facilities 
often appoint social workers who are employees to serve as 
independent donor advocates.  These facilities could be motivated 
financially to perform a donation procedure.  Thus, an employee of a 
medical facility might be biased to act in favor of her employer because 
the employer compensates her.  Additionally, in situations where there 
is a concern about a parent’s motives or what is in the minor donor’s 
best interest, judicial intervention is essential; however, the Committee 
states that a healthcare committee may be appropriate to review a case 
with such a concern.272 
V. OTHER CARE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Other countries and jurisdictions have codified uniform 
standards for managing the care of minor donor-siblings throughout 
the bone marrow transplantation process.   In Canada, the Oncology 
Division of Pediatric Medicine Department published guidelines for 
the performance of bone marrow aspirations in children.273  Prior to the 
donation procedure, hospitals in Canada require that the minor donor-
sibling be assessed according to written policies and procedures.274   
 
269 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398-
99. 
270 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 400. 
271 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398. 
272 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 400. 
273 M. Campbell et al., How Young Is Too Young to Be a Living Donor?, 13 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 1643 (2013). 
274 Id. at 1645. 
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The World Marrow Donor Association (hereinafter “WMDA”) 
also published recommended guidelines for managing related donors, 
not sibling donors, that some transplant centers implement.275  First, 
WMDA recommends that counseling be available for each family 
member prior to HLA testing.276  Counseling includes written 
information inclusive of all aspects of the family donation procedure 
and care management processes.277  Counseling should also include the 
option for the donor to decide not to donate.278  However, if the donor 
is not capable of making a meaningful decision or is not legally 
competent to provide consent, an independent donor advocate should 
determine if moving forward with the transplantation process is in the 
child’s best interest.  Next, transplant centers should establish 
procedures to ensure that donors are appropriately counseled regarding 
their right to refuse typing or donation because related donors may be 
emotionally or physically unable or hesitant to donate while 
simultaneously experiencing pressure from other family members.279  
The donor should be appointed a donor advocate and be examined by 
a physician not associated with the transplant center or involved in the 
recipient’s care.280  The donor must maintain the right to disclose or 
not disclose the communications with the advocate to interested parties 
such as the recipient or relatives.281  Lastly, the WMDA recommends 
establishing procedures which evaluate the clinical risk to the donor 
and address the recording of adverse events and long-term follow ups 
for related donors.282 
The WMDA properly recognized that it is important for an 
independent physician who understands donors’ rights to examine the 
potential minor donor-sibling prior to match testing.  Some transplant 
centers substitute a donor advocate or independent physician for a 
transplant team member; however, the donor advocate should be a 
person who is not a member of the transplant team, is not involved 
with the recipient’s care, is educated about the risks and side effects of 
the transplant procedure, can perceive any coercion during the 
 
275 S.M. van Walraven et al., Family Donor Care Management: Principles and 
Recommendations, 45 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 1269 (2010). 




280 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270. 
281 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270. 
282 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273. 
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independent donor assessment, and can represent the donor in an 
unbiased manner.283  This author endorses the WMDA’s 
recommendation that potential donors be counseled prior to match 
testing.284  If a counselor identifies any obvious reluctance to donate, 
or any medical problems that would preclude donation, a deferral of 
complete match testing is allowed.285  A counselor’s qualifications and 
role are not delineated in the guidelines. 
Additionally, the WMDA properly recommends that the family 
member is provided the opportunity to decide whether to become a 
donor.286  Minor donor-siblings do not have the anonymous choice 
when deciding whether to become a donor, whereas volunteers have 
the luxury to decide for themselves without feelings of coercion or the 
knowledge that a sibling needs a match to survive.  Generally, a minor 
sibling is directly approached by a parent accompanied by a hospital 
representative with the request for an HLA compatibility typing or 
bone marrow match test for her sick sibling.287  At the time of this 
request, the recipient is often identified as a candidate for a bone 
marrow transplant.288  This author also maintains that a positive 
balance should exist prior to proceeding with the process.289  This 
balance is found by comparing the risks to the donor with the benefit 
to the recipient, in addition to the benefit to the donor with the risks to 
the patient, including the physical and emotional effects.290    
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL ACT TO PROTECT MINOR 
DONOR-SIBLINGS 
Under Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution, 
Congress can use its spending power to incentivize states to comply 
with its laws.291  States could adopt the program created by the statute 
and accept its conditions,292 provided that such conditions, which could 
provide an adequate minimum standard of protection, are explicitly 
 
283 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1271. 
284 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273. 
285 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273. 
286 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270-71. 
287 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1271. 
288 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270-71. 
289 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273. 
290 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1271-72. 
291 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
292 Conditions are statutory requirements that must be met in order to receive funds.  
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stated and have some relationship to the purpose of the act.  Here, the 
purpose of the act would be to protect minor donor-siblings, and states 
would use the funds to achieve such purpose.  The act should require 
all transplant centers in the state to establish a specific ethics 
committee to address minor donor-sibling cases to protect these 
children’s interests and screen for possible issues requiring judicial 
intervention.293  
Legislation addressing how to handle this issue would benefit 
the states, courts, healthcare facilities, and minor donor-siblings.  For 
example, the section of the legislation regarding ethics may state that 
the purpose of the program is to enable states to develop and establish 
ethical committees in all transplant centers managing minor donor-
siblings to accomplish specific objectives.  The section may include 
the following objectives: (1) to protect minor donor-siblings and their 
interests throughout the transplantation process; (2) to ensure minor 
donor-siblings’ safety and prevent subjecting them to unnecessary 
medical procedures and risks; (3) to address any and all conflicts of 
interest; and (4) to provide support services such as counseling prior to 
match testing and post-donation.  Such an act would provide a 
minimum degree of protection for all minor donor-siblings in the 
United States, would provide guidance to transplant facilities 
overseeing minor sibling donations, and would decrease future 
litigation surrounding this issue.  Congress should take into account 
the nature of the proposed donation,294 the ages, maturity, and 
psychological state of the children involved, and the substantial benefit 
to the donor.  
The act may prescribe requirements for pre-transplantation 
data gathering in which the patient and possible donor-sibling are 
evaluated.  The evaluation can include taking detailed histories, 
reviewing physical examinations, and performing imaging and 
laboratory studies on the patient and minor sibling.295  The detailed 
history should include the history of the underlying disease prior- and 
post-treatment, history of infectious complications associated with the 
procedure, family medical history, drug allergies, past medical 
conditions, and social and psychological status.296  Laboratory studies 
 
293 See Rosenthal, supra note 172.   
294 Congress should consider the invasiveness of the donation procedure in conjunction with 
all possible side effects, both long-term and short-term.  See CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8.  
295 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 36. 
296 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 36. 
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may include HLA-typing, blood typing, blood counts, and liver 
function tests.297  A subsequent condition may require appointing an 
independent donor advocate to siblings ten-years-old or younger prior 
to match testing.  Lastly, a condition may require checking national 
and international bone marrow registries for an adult donor prior to 
subjecting the minor sibling to HLA-testing.   
Minor siblings acting as donors require special consideration 
before beginning the care management process; therefore, this author 
recommends the following proposals.  An independent physician must 
first examine the child to establish whether the minor donor-sibling is 
capable of assenting or providing informed consent to donating.  A 
donor advocate with legal training or a court could make the 
determination that a child is a mature minor.  If the child is not capable 
of assenting or providing informed consent, an independent donor 
advocate, such as an attorney, for the child should be appointed to 
protect the child’s interests.  This is essential because the parent 
providing consent on behalf of the minor donor-sibling likely has 
conflicting feelings concerning the welfare of both the patient and the 
donor.  Next, it must be determined whether the possible donor-sibling 
could and would endure the donation procedure, both physically and 
mentally, prior to subjecting that sibling to match testing.  In addition, 
a per se rule could apply for children who are fifteen-years-old or older 
in which they are presumed to be competent to consent to a medical 
procedure alone.  
States could use the grant funding to establish, train, and staff 
ethical committees at transplant centers that only review minor donor-
sibling cases which would screen for ethical issues and concerns about 
using a child as a donor for her sibling.  For example, such a committee 
would evaluate and independently assess a minor donor-sibling’s 
physical, mental, and emotional health after medical professionals 
examine the child.  The committee would consider the 
recommendations of medical professionals, such as independent 
physicians, social workers, and psychologists specializing in child 
development.  Such medical professionals would evaluate the overall 
health of the child and give an opinion about a minor donor’s mental, 
cognitive, emotional, and physical maturity.  The committee would 
review the professional reports and consider the minor’s age, the 
parties’ interests, the prognosis and condition of the patient-recipient 
 
297 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 36. 
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and the maturity of the minor donor-sibling when deciding whether 
judicial intervention is appropriate.  The committee members could be 
chosen through an application process and, if selected, be required to 
attend a training session that addresses legal, ethical, and medical 
issues surrounding minor donor cases.  Lastly, this process would 
consider the interests of the parents, the minor donor-sibling, the 
recipient, and the medical institution.  
This author recognizes that using children as donors involves 
the same complex considerations relating to voluntary participation 
and using children in research.298  In both contexts, issues of assent, 
consent, and parental permission arise.299  For minor donor-siblings 
involving children whose capacity to understand resembles that of 
adults, the initial inquiry to determine whether the child is capable of 
assenting or advocating for herself should be assessed.  Congress may 
refer to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development and Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development when addressing the maturity of a minor 
respecting age.300  This mechanism would assist courts in determining 
the maturity of a child when making decisions concerning a minor 
donor-sibling’s interests and what the child wants to do.   
In addition, Congress could categorize minors according to an 
established age range based on known scientific information about the 
cognitive and moral development of children.301  For example, 
Congress may recommend that children who are fifteen years old or 
older can decide to donate for themselves per se as long as the child is 
not mentally incompetent due to a physical condition or disability.  
This system will assist courts in determining the maturity of a child 
when making decisions concerning a minor donor-sibling.  
Additionally, Congress should establish factors the courts may 
consider to determine what is in the best interest of the minor donor-
sibling and the patient-recipient.  Concerning the minor donor-sibling, 
 
298 See Research with Children FAQs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/children-research/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  The Institutional Review Board considers the child’s age, 
maturity, and psychological state when determining whether a child is capable of assent.  See 
id. 
299 Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91. 
300 Hing Keung Ma, The Moral Development of the Child: An Integrated Model, 1 
FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH 57 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC38 
60007/. 
301 See Kohlberg’s Theory and Piaget’s Theory, PSYCHOL. NOTES HQ (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.psychologynoteshq.com/kohlbergstheory/. 
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factors may include pre-operation requirements, associated risks or 
complications of donating, absence from school, requirements to take 
medication post-donation and pre-donation, and the invasiveness of 
the operation.  Concerning the patient-recipient, factors may include 
the prognosis post-procedure, the associated medical risks, and the 
quality of life post-donation.  
Congress should further delineate, based on age, a way that 
state courts or ethics committees can assess what the child wants and 
whether the child is being pressured into donating.  Each child’s 
development will vary; thus, courts must assess each minor donor-
sibling case on an individual and fact-specific basis.  Congress should 
enact a statute for a program that would be funded by a grant in which 
states can adopt and implement the program to protect minor donor-
siblings’ interests and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.  
Managing minor donor-siblings should be addressed by Congress and 
not state legislatures because the adoption of such a program 
contributes to maintaining a uniform standard that provides minimum 
protection for these children throughout the transplantation process. 
However, if the child is not a mature minor, then whether the 
minor donor is capable of assenting to the bone marrow donation 
should be assessed.  A minor donor assents when the child 
affirmatively agrees to participate in the transplant process by actively 
demonstrating her willingness instead of just following directions to 
participate.302  Failure to object, not resisting, or just complying with 
directions should not be construed as assent.  The minor donor’s age, 
maturity, psychological state of mind, experience, and level of 
understanding should be taken into account.  A minor who may be 
mature enough to fully comprehend the nature of the transplant process 
should be consulted about being tested and donating.  Such a minor 
should be provided with an accurate picture of what the experience of 
donating bone marrow is likely to be.  For example, such possible 
minor donors should be provided with the information a doctor would 
provide his patient when obtaining informed consent.303  The assent 
procedure should reflect a reasonable effort to enable the child to 
understand—to the degree they are capable—what their participation 
in the donation process would involve.  This determination should be 
made for all minor donor-siblings prior to subjecting them to bone 
 
302 Research with Children FAQs, supra note 298. 
303 See Informed Consent, AMA, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/informed-
consent (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).   
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marrow match testing.  After a minor sibling donates, the child should 
participate in a routine psychological evaluation and follow up process 
involving counseling of the donor.   
Although parents have the recognized right to make healthcare 
decisions for their minor children, a strong argument can be made that 
a clear conflict of interest exists that will affect their judgment in cases 
involving minor donor-siblings.  Parents might prioritize and make 
decisions according to what is in the best interest of their sick child, 
and they might minimize and neglect how such decisions affect the 
minor donor-sibling throughout the transplantation process.  As such, 
Congress should establish factors to be considered in determining what 
is in the best interests of the minor donor-sibling and the patient 
recipient.  
Congress should also prescribe a mechanism that compares the 
benefits of proceeding with the transplantation against the potential 
harm or risks associated with the procedure for each child.  Lastly, 
Congress should specifically delineate what constitutes a substantial 
benefit in minor donor cases.304  To help, a neutral donor advocate 
should be appointed and have the right to consent, or refuse consent, 
to bone marrow match testing on behalf of a possible minor donor-
sibling regardless of what a parent believes is in the best interests of 
the donor-sibling because a clear conflict of interest exists which can 
inherently impair the parent’s judgment.   
A donor advocate should be appointed for all minors who are 
being considered as bone marrow donors prior to match testing.  The 
independent donor advocate should determine what the child wants 
and determine whether the child is being pressured to donate given the 
totality of circumstances.  The donor advocate’s primary role is to 
represent the potential minor donor-sibling’s interests and well-being 
throughout the transplant process.  Such an advocate should be 
appointed prior to genetic compatibility testing to ensure that the child 
fully understands what the procedure entails prior to deciding whether 
submitting to testing is in the minor donor-sibling’s best interest. 
Donor advocates who become alerted to or concerned about the 
interests of the minor donor-sibling should seek judicial intervention 
to delay or prevent the donation.   
 
304 For example, if the donor shares a close relationship with the patient-sibling and there is 
a strong likelihood that a transplant would place the patient-sibling in remission, then the donor 
would enjoy the benefit of continuing to share a close relationship with the patient-sibling. 
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Under circumstances that warrant concern,305 a judicial bypass 
procedure such as a conference before a judge should occur within a 
reasonable time to address the minor’s interests, to determine whether 
an attorney for the child should be appointed and whether parental 
authority to consent on behalf of the child should be waived.  Lastly, 
it should be noted that each child’s development306 will vary, and cases 
should be determined on an individual and fact-specific basis.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
Hematopoietic cell transplants that use bone marrow as the 
graft source are not only a potentially life-saving treatment, but they 
are also a high-risk medical procedure.307  Minor donor-siblings must 
be thoroughly evaluated prior to match testing and the extraction 
procedure, and they must be monitored post-transplant.308  In addition, 
parents are torn between forcing their healthy child to provide bone 
marrow to their other child and doing what is in the best interests of 
the both children; both options are at odds with one another.  However, 
the current legal scheme is deficient and needs extensive reform.  
Therefore, Congress should enact a statute that protects minor donor-
siblings’ interests throughout the transplantation process in the United 
States.  States may enact laws that provide additional protections to 
these children.  These protections will help to eliminate some of the 
conflicts of interest present in the current system in the United States. 
 
305 For example, an ethics committee member may express concern about a minor donor-
sibling. 
306 Hing Keung Ma, supra note 301.  
307 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8. 
308 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8. 
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